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BOOK REVIEW
FRONTIERS OF TAx REFORM.
EDITED BY MICHAEL J. BOSKIN.'
STANFORD: HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS.
PP. xvII - 202. $32.95.
Reviewed by Erik M. Jensent
Radical tax reform is on hold, but dissatisfaction with the
current revenue system is so pervasive that the possibility of
change won't go away. Of course, if significant change actually
occurred, we'd immediately start longing for the good old days.
There's already pining for the Camelot that, conventional wis-
dom has it, was the Tax Reform Act of 1986.' After its enact-
ment, popular and scholarly works praised the unusual public-spirit-
edness reflected in its passage.2 Everyone assumes "[m]oney is the
t Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and Tully M. Friedman Professor of Economics,
Stanford University.
tt Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
2. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM (1987);
TIMOTHY J. CONLAN El AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM (1990).
Substantial positive discussion of the 1986 Act can also be found in HEDRICK SMITH,
THE POWER GAMiE: How WASHINGTON WORKS (1988). A less starry-eyed view of the
politics behind the passage of the 1986 Act is presented in BARBER A. CONABLE, JR.,
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
engine that fuels much of our politics, '3 but in 1986, the story
goes, money ran out of gas. For one brief shining moment, the
Gucci-clad lobbyists were repulsed by Congress, and the public
interest was served.
But the 1986 victory, such as it was, came undone. Hence the
pining. Michael Boskin, an economist affiliated with Stanford Uni-
versity and the Hoover Institution, and a former chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, writes in Frontiers of Tax Reform,
"[T]he implicit 1986 contract for a broader base and lower rates
has been dramatically reversed-first in 1990, with a modest in-
crease in effective tax rates (but a whopping break of a political
pledge!), and substantially in 1993, when top marginal rates were
increased by about one-third!"4
In fact, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was never as virtuous as
its proponents suggested. The '86 Act took a lot of low-income
people off the income-tax rolls, and that was good for them. But it
didn't mean simplification for many of us, except in the most
trivial sense-lessening the number of tax brackets.5 Even had the
Act not contained oxymoronic horrors like the passive activity loss
rules,6 it would have been an interpretational challenge. Change is
itself confusing. Boskin notes, "In many ways the simplest tax
system would be one that was the same year after year after year,
facilitating planning and diffusing understanding."7 And some of
the true 1986 simplifications-like eliminating the capital gains
preferences-bit the dust quickly.
The process that gave birth to the Act was also overpraised.
Former Congressman Barber Conable has argued that the process
was not that different from business-as-usual and, for that matter,
the usual in tax matters is not nearly as bad as people think.9 The
Internal Revenue Code grows complex not because of private inter-
CONGRESS AND THE INCoME TAX 78-91 (1989).
3. Albert R. Hunt, Introduction to BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 2, at xii.
4. Michael J. Boskin, Introduction to FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM xi, xii (Michael J.
Boskin ed. 1996) [hereinafter FRONTims].
5. Since most taxpayers look at tables to figure out the tax due, whether there are
two brackets or 105 doesn't matter. For planners, the critical consideration is the marginal
rate, which also doesn't depend on how many brackets there are.
6. Although monstrously complex, the passive activity loss rules in Internal Revenue
Code section 469 have been characterized as simplifications, in that they destroyed the tax
shelter industry at which they were directed. See Stanley A. Koppelman, At-Risk and
Passive Activity Limitations: Can Complexity Be Reduced?, 45 TAX L. REV. 97 (1989).
7. Boskin, supra note 4, at xiii.
8. Having no preference for capital gains is unquestionably a simplification; much
(although certainly not all) of the Internal Revenue Code's complexity can be reduced if
taxpayers have less incentive to structure their affairs to lower the rate at which income
will be taxed.
9. See CONABLE, supra note 2, at 78-91.
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ests asserting their power unchecked, but because of Congressmen
acting in good faith (for the most part), trying to treat different
cases differently. Conable labels this the "ABC syndrome": since
A's case is slightly different from B's, which is slightly different
from C's-and so on-each deserves special treatment. One man's
loophole is another man's national priority. Tax complexity is a
price we pay, Conable argues, for representation and compro-
mise-and for living in a complex society. Thus the breakdown of
the '86 Act was neither surprising nor distressing.
Whatever the merits of the '86 Act, Michael Boskin and the
other twelve contributors to Frontiers of Tax Reform, a valuable
collection of papers originally presented at a Hoover Institution
conference held in May 1995, are not really interested in going
back to 1986. With only a couple of exceptions, the contributors
are economists," and they want to start over with a dramatically
different tax system. None of them defend things-as-they-are. Al-
though they disagree on particulars, the contributors are in almost
complete agreement that a move to a consumption tax is the way
to go. Some even think major change is inevitable.
In the last paragraph of Frontiers, Harvard economist Dale
Jorgenson pretty much sums up the conference:
[C]hanging the federal tax base from income to consump-
tion is an idea whose time has come. This change will
create important new opportunities for growth in the stan-
dard of living of all Americans. The traditional objections
to consumption as a base for taxation on grounds of fair-
ness have been successfully addressed in the Armey flat tax
and the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax proposals. These propos-
als would create substantial new growth opportunities for
the U.S. economy. Both are based on well-established
economic ideas and could serve as a point of departure for
tax reform legislation. 2
Jorgenson is writing only for himself, and not all the contributors
would agree with everything he says. For example, Cato Institute
economist Stephen Moore would hold out, on libertarian grounds,
for a national sales tax.13 But I can imagine a lot of heads at the
10. The exceptions are Kenneth Kies, a lawyer and Chief of Staff for the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, and U.S. Representative Bill Archer, self-described as "the first chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee to do his own tax return year after year." Bill
Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 3, 4.
11. See, e.g., Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National
Sales Tax, in FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 110, 118 ("Broad-based tax reform seems
almost a political certainty over the next two years.").
12. Dale W. Jorgenson, The Economic Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRON-
TIERS, supra note 4, at 181, 194.
13. See Moore, supra note 11, at 114-19 (arguing that neither the Armey flat tax nor
1996]
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conference nodding yes, yes, yes, as Jorgenson spoke.
I'm skeptical that any important tax can really be structured so
we can use postcards to file our returns, as Robert Hall and Alvin
Rabushka suggest in their essay 4 -a condensation of the book
that provides the intellectual framework for Representative Dick
Armey's flat-tax plan." From their ivory-tower podia, Hall and
Rabushka robustly recommend eliminating all non-business (and
many business) deductions, effectively turning what looks like an
income tax into a consumption tax. Maybe it is politically possible
to dispense with interest deductions and interest income, as Hall-
Rabushka suggest, and to substitute expensing for the incredible
complexities of depreciation allowances. 6 But flat-tax proposals
hit the political wall when they consider eliminating deductions for
home-mortgage interest and charitable contributions.17
Nitpicking aside, everyone agrees that even a less-than-perfect
consumption tax could be much simpler than the current income-
tax system, and everyone wants simplicity'---except those of us
who would have to find new professions.'9 As Charles McLure
the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax proposal adequately addresses the intrusiveness of the cur-
rent tax code, which is a civil liberties rather than an economic concern).
14. See Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple, Progressive Con-
sumption Tax, in FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 27, 31-36.
15. ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
16. See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 14, at 35.
17. Perhaps because of his government experience, Boskin realistically suggests a grad-
ual transition if the home-mortgage-interest deduction is to be eliminated. See Michael J.
Boskin, A Framework for the Tax Reform Debate, in FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 11, 24
(noting that home values reflect the mortgage-interest deduction and that the largest asset
for a majority of American families is home equity). He also argues that "the charitable
deduction yields more for charities than it 'loses the Treasury' (i.e., it is an efficient way
to finance charities)." Id. Preserving the deduction would then make sense even under a
flat tax.
18. The area of clearest agreement among the contributors is that too much time and
energy are devoted to compliance under today's system. Boskin writes that estimates of
the compliance burden "range from more than $100 billion to almost $600 billion, with
well over 5 billion hours of human effort devoted to that task." Id. at 10. Hall and
Rabushka add, "Complex tax forms and tax laws do more harm that [sic] just deforesting
America. Complicated taxes require expensive advisers for taxpayers and equally expensive
reviews and audits by the government." Hall & Rabushka, supra note 14, at 29. And
Murray Weidenbaum, Washington University economist and another former chair of the
Council of Economic Advisers, quotes Robert Eisner. "I am happy to stipulate that we
waste many, many billions of person-hours and hundreds of billions of dollars in adminis-
tering, complying with and seeking to avoid or evade current income taxes." Murray
Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons, in FRONTIERS,
supra note 4, at 54, 62 (quoting ROBERT EISNER, THE PROPOSED SALES AND WAGE TAX:
FAiR, FLAT OR FOOLISH? (paper presented to the American Enterprise Institute, Washing-
ton D.C.)).
19. Maybe this should concern everyone. What mischief would we tax lawyers and
accountants get into if we didn't have a complex law to administer? One might think of
the current tax law as a public works scheme: it keeps lawyers and accountants occupied
and out of trouble. I am indebted (in a legally unenforceable way) to Jonathan Entin-an
[Vol. 47:253
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and George Zodrow emphasize in their fascinating essay on the
direct taxation of consumption, a consumption tax can be based on
cash flow.2' We therefore could do away with many of the timing
rules that have encumbered the income tax, and could avoid (or at
least lessen) the distortion of the income-tax base caused by infla-
tion.
Of course, a consumption tax has more than simplification to
recommend it. Tufts University economist Gilbert Metcalf argues
that the goal of defining income is chimerical; we're fooling our-
selves if we think we can do it in an intellectually defensible
way.2 Moving to a consumption tax, particularly a value-added
tax, would give us something we can define and measure as a tax
base. And consumption may well serve as a useful approximation
for income. Michael Boskin argues that taxpayers typically smooth
out consumption when income fluctuates: "Consumption in any
year may well be a better proxy for permanent income than is
income in that year."'
The most important justification for a consumption tax is that it
would further national savings and capital formation, a goal all
Frontiers contributors endorse. For example, Boston University
economist Laurence Kotlikoff emphasizes, "Our country continues
to save at a critically low rate and, correspondingly, consume at an
extremely high rate."' Boskin adds, "[C]apital formation is taxed
especially heavily in the United States, relative to other uses of
income and relative to our competitors."24
Among their many virtues, the essays in Frontiers set out the
basics of the major consumption-tax alternatives that have been
discussed in the past couple of years. Not everything is
new-indeed, many of the papers are modifications of previously
administrative law specialist, for crying out loud-for this interesting thought.
20. See Charles E. McLure Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the Direct
Taxation of Consumption, in FRONMrlnss, supra note 4, at 70 (proposing a hybrid con-
sumption tax based entirely on cash flow, including cash flow treatment of borrowing and
lending for businesses, but not for individuals). McLure and Zodrow are economists at
The Hoover Institution and Rice University, respectively.
21. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Role of a Value-Added Tax in Fundamental Tax Re-
form, in FROmimRS, supra note 4, at 91, 106.
22. Boskin, supra note 17, at 19.
23. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail Sales
Tax Example, in FRONTiERS, supra note 4, at 160, 160. Kotlikoff presents interesting data
demonstrating that there have been both a redistribution of resources to older Americans
and a decline in the propensity of older Americans to save. See id. at 163-65.
24. Boskin, supra note 17, at 18 (emphasis deleted). See also Jorgenson, supra note
12, at 181 ("To achieve a more satisfactory growth performance, the tax burden on in-
vestment must be reduced substantially."); id. at 193 ("[Increases in tax rates for upper-
income taxpayers in 1990 and 1993 have nullified many of the growth opportunities for
the U.S. economy created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986."). Ah-h-h, the '86 Act. See
supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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published work-but it's good to have the material collected in one
place. Hall and Rabushka discuss their flat-tax proposal.2
Weidenbaum evaluates the Nunn-Domenici USA (unlimited savings
allowance) Tax, another form of consumption tax that would use
the income-tax structure as a starting point'5 Several essays con-
sider the value-added tax ("VAT") and other versions of a national
sales tax.27 McLure and Zodrow promote a hybrid direct consump-
tion tax that would pick up characteristics from some of the other
proposals.' And so on.
The essays, not surprisingly, are of varying quality, but each is
worthy of study. Because the authors are mostly economists writing
about economics, the reading can be rough going at times. Else-
where I've written that "[ilt's the prose that makes economics the
dismal science," '29 but the prose is actually quite good here. It's
just that the material doesn't lend itself to the literary equivalent of
sound bites.
Also not surprisingly, where many of the essays fall down is in
their tenuous connection to the real world. The possibility that any
of the proposals might be adopted in something like a pristine
form is so remote as to be laughable? These are academic agen-
da-setting pieces, not politicians' proposals. I think the authors
know that, but flashes of realism appear only as asides. For exam-
ple, Hall and Rabushka write, "We have not made concessions to
the political pressures that may well force the nation to accept an
improved tax system that falls short of the ideal we have in
mind."'" Ronald Pearlman, former Chief of Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation, recently complained that "[slo far
this debate [about consumption taxes] has taken place in a
very academic context.'3 2 Frontiers is exactly the sort of thing
Pearlman is referring to.
25. See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 14.
26. See Weidenbaum, supra note 18, at 54 (noting that under the Nunn-Domenici plan,
the individual income tax would be converted into a progressive consumption tax while a
new business tax would replace both the existing corporate tax and the individual tax on
profits from businesses).
27. See Metcalf, supra note 21; Moore, supra note 11; Kotlikoff, supra note 23.
28. See McLure & Zodrow, supra note 20.
29. Erik M. Jensen, An Economics Book That's Fun To Read, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVE-
LAND), Feb. 20, 1994, at lH (reviewing STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, Tim ARMCHAIR
ECONOMIST (1994)). I also wrote: "Can you imagine the late Orson Welles running the
100-yard dash? That's how most economists write-thump, wobble, thump, wobble. You
get nowhere slowly, and you want to throw up at the end." Id.
30. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
31. Hall & Rabushka, supra note 14, at 41.
32. Louis Lyons, Pearlman: Transition Problems May Stop Reform, But Not an Add-on
VAT, 72 TAX NOTES 792, 792 (1996) [hereinafter Pearman] (quoting Ronald A.
Pearlman).
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That the essays suffer from academic otherworldliness doesn't
mean that we should resist simplification-certainly we should
study ideal models before we return to earthly policy-but we do
need to be realistic in evaluating particular proposals. Frontiers
would have been strengthened if there had been more participation
by consumption-tax skeptics; the income tax after all, have its
defenders, even among economists.
Major, long-lasting tax reform is likely to founder for two
reasons. One is the ABC syndrome described by Barber
Conable.33 Equally important-maybe more important-are the
transition problems in moving to an entirely different revenue
system. These problems may not be fatal, but they can't be ig-
nored.34
The most important essay in this book, dealing with many of
the potentially intractable transition problems, is by Princeton Uni-
versity economist, David Bradford." Recognizing that we've had
major tax legislation before, Bradford urges us to plow ahead with
a consumption tax, but he doesn't minimize the transition difficul-
ties. Bradford has thought hard about such issues as how we
should deal with consumption from "old capital," capital that was
saved on an after-tax basis under the old tax regime. How should
we deal with a taxpayer who acquired depreciable property under
the old regime basing his investment decision on a stream of de-
preciation deductions that will disappear under a consumption tax?
And McLure and Zodrow remind us that the United States has
entered into a multitude of double-taxation treaties, all of which
would have to be renegotiated if the United States changes its tax
system.36 Tough problems.
If we do move toward a consumption tax, what form should it
take? In general, the Frontiers essays show little enthusiasm for a
VAT. A European model VAT is not a simple taxing mechanism,
33. See supra text following note 9.
34. David Bradford writes:
There seem to be two main attitudes toward transition in connection with major
tax reform. One approach is to minimize it in the interest of moving ahead to
achieve the reformer's objective. The other is to become intimidated with the
problems of transition so that they form a roadblock to change.
David F. Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in FRON-
TIERS, supra note 4, at 123, 147. Hall and Rabushka discuss how to deal with transition
problems, particularly the treatment of depreciation and interest deductions associated with
obligations entered into under the existing tax system, but their hearts aren't in it: "Fortu-
nately, this is a temporary problem. Once existing capital is fully depreciated and existing
borrowing paid off, any special transitions provisions can be taken off the books." Hall &
Rabushka, supra note 14, at 41.
35. See Bradford, supra note 34.
36. See McLure & Zodrow, supra note 20, at 71.
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particularly for a nation in which such a tax would be entirely
new. Weidenbaum notes, "Despite the wishes of some of the pro-
ponents, under [a VAT], the Internal Revenue Service will not
wither away."37 And there are legitimate concerns about the
regressivity of a VAT,38 although some contributors think those
concerns are overstated or can be overcome.39
Several Frontiers authors are worried that, because a VAT is
so politically palatable-after an adjustment period, the tax be-
comes invisible and therefore painlesso--it would be enacted not
as a replacement for the existing system, but in addition to it. For
example, Weidenbaum writes that both the Nunn-Domenici and the
Armey-Hall-Rabushka proposals "are similar enough to the existing
income tax to avoid the danger that accompanies a sales tax or
VAT-the likelihood that Congress will wind up approving both
(that was the case with Medicare and Medicaid, which originally
37. Weidenbaum, supra note 18, at 66.
38. It would surprise the man on the street, but there's substantial agreement that the
current system is progressive. Boskin writes, "Today the top 5 percent of taxpayers pays
almost half of all federal income taxes, and the bottom 50 percent, only 5 percent."
Boskin, supra note 4, at xii. Moore adds, "[A]fter Ronald Reagan cut income tax rates in
the 1980s, the share of income taxes paid by the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans went
from 18 percent in 1981 to 25 percent in 1990." Moore, supra note 11, at 111 (citing
Stephen Moore, Weighing Reaganomics, SAN DIEGO UNION, Nov. 10, 1991, at cl, c4, and
LAWRENCE LINDSEY, THE GROWrH ExPEIMENT 82-104 (1990)). And Kies writes: "The
taxpayers in the bottom 40 percent bracket pay 4.9 percent of the combined income tax
and Social Security taxes, assuming all Social Security taxes are paid by the employee.
The top 1 percent pays 18.6 percent. The top 10 percent pays about 48.6 percent." Ken-
neth J. Kies, Providing Appropriate Information on Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS, supra note
4, at 151.
39. Kotlikoff argues that the "concern [about] the lack of progressivity of a proportion-
al national sales tax . . . has been overstated because progressivity has been measured in
terms of annual, rather than lifetime, income." Kotlikoff, supra note 23, at 171. A sales
tax could be made progressive, he argues, through a refundable credit. See id. Moore
suggests a rebate of the sales tax paid on the first $5,000 of purchases. See Moore, supra
note 11, at 117. But see David G. Raboy, Consumption Tax Preferential Treatment: Poor
Cure for Regressivity, 72 TAX NOTES 901 (1996) (arguing that preferential treatment for
necessities like food does not cure, and in fact may worsen, regressivity problems of
consumption taxes).
40. Or if it's visible it's avoidable by not buying affected products. Thomas Cooley
wrote in 1876:
['lhis method enables the government, in the language of Turgot, "to pluck the
goose without making it cry out," since those who pay do not perceive, or at
least do not reflect, that a part of what they pay as price is really paid as a
tax. Montesqueiu says: "There are two states in Europe where the imposts are
very heavy upon liquors; in one the brewer alone pays the duty, in the other it
is levied indiscriminately upon all the consumers; in the first, nobody feels the
rigor of the impost, in the second, it is looked upon as a grievance. In the
former, the subject is sensible only of the liberty he has of not paying, in the
latter, he feels only the necessity that compels him to pay."
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 5 n.3 (Chicago, Callaghan
and Company 1876) (quoting MoNTEsQuIEu, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 13, ch. 7).
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were developed as alternatives rather than supplements to each
other)."'" Boskin also fears that a VAT might be used as a sup-
plemental diet to feed the omnivorous federal bureaucracy; in other
industrialized countries VATs don't replace complex income-tax
systems.42  And transition issues are greatly reduced with
an add-on tax. In short, a VAT is too politically feasible because it
needn't take the place of anything.43
Frontiers of Tax Reform has much to feast on, but one quixotic
issue is ignored in all the papers. In their essay, McLure and
Zodrow draw an important distinction: "Indirect consumption taxes
[like a VAT] are levied on business with the expectation that they
will be shifted to consumers," while "direct consumption taxes
[like the flat tax] are levied 'directly' on the consumption of indi-
viduals, commonly through the filing of tax returns."" The terms
"indirect" and "direct" might remind the non-econo-
mist--economists needn't worry about mundane things like the
Constitution-of two constitutional provisions that limit congressio-
nal power to enact "direct taxes."'45 The way terms are used by
economists in 1996 doesn't necessarily tell us anything about the
meaning of the Constitution, but neither are modem definitions
necessarily irrelevant. Doesn't anyone worry about the constitution-
ality of unapportioned consumption taxes, especially direct con-
sumption taxes?'
41. Weidenbaum, supra note 18, at 65.
42. See Boskin, supra note 14, at 23.
43. See Pearlman, supra note 32, at 792 (arguing that a VAT is likely to be added on
to our income tax system, in part because there would be few transition problems, and
commenting that "in the real world, I don't see a full replacement system. I just don't
see it happening").
44. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 20, at 70.
45. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring direct taxes to be apportioned accord-
ing to population); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (prohibiting direct taxes, except those
that are proportional to population). The Sixteenth Amendment eliminated the apportion-
ment requirement for "taxes on incomes," regardless of the source of the income, but by
its terms it did nothing to change the requirement for other direct taxes. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVI.
46. Well, yes, someone does. See Erik M. Jensen, The Meaning of "Direct Taxes:"
The Constitutionality of Consumption Taxes (not done yet, but soon).
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